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ceivable and inventory are desirable.85
Although accountancy is not an exact science, it must be recog-
nized that it is founded upon "certain fundamental principles which
are universal and immutable and which give recognition to the fact
that there is only one truth in everything and no half truth, or quarter
truth, or approximations of the truth." 86
ROERT A. KLEIN.
SCIENTIFIc AIDS IN PROOF.
A legal philosopher' points to the faithful reconstruction of past
events as the basis for just determinations. Under our system of trial
by jury, however, such reconstructions rank as rare phenomena.
There are at least four obvious reasons for this. First, a substantial
portion of the fact-materials available for this task may not be pre-
sented to the jury.2 Second, the main, and often the sole, liaison
between the past event and the present trial is oral testimony. Such
a connection, constructed of imperfect observation, faulty recollection,
accounts receivable, inventory, and surplus, The author of the falsifications
was an employee of Homes & Davis, the auditors of Interstate Hosiery. One
of the questions was whether the management of Interstate Hosiery should have
discovered the gross overstatements of their position in the financial reports
submitted to them by the auditors. The S. E. C. held that the management
should have a general conception of its financial position so that it would recog-
nize, for example, the overstatement in its cash position of almost 1617. Said
the Securities and Exchange Commission, "The fundamental and primary
responsibility for the accuracy of information filed with the Commission and
disseminated among investors rests upon management. Management does not
discharge its obligations in this respect by the employment of independent public
accountants, however reputable."
N. Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1939, p. 35, col. 1: P. A. Benson, President of the
American Bankers Association, was reported as urging statutory legislation vest-
ing in auditors the power to demand from corporate managements compliance
with specific requirements necessary for accurate and honest accounting. In the
Wall St. J., Jan. 18, 1939: reporting that the General Foods Corporation
appointed a controller and an assistant controller responsible directly to the
board of directors. Suggestions have also been made to rotate the auditors.
'See note 42, supra.
Chairman Korner, Appeal of Goodell-Pratt Co., 3 B. T. A. 30, 34 (1924).
'Radin, The Permanent Problems of the Law (1929) 15 CORN. L. Q. 1.
2 * * * whatever is relevant is admissible unless it is subject to one or
another of the exclusionary principles or rules." Michael and Adler, The Trial
of an Issue of Fact: 1I (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 1462, 1463; 1 WIGMORE, EvI-
DENcE (2d ed. 1923) § 9; Cf. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF (3d
ed. 1937) § 1.
"To the influence of jury trial may be attributed the most characteristic
element of the law of evidence, the exclusionary rules * * *." Rosenthal, The




and defective narration, makes for a supply of inferior fact-materials. 3
Third, bias and the motive to lie frequently account for the withhold-
ing of fact-materials and for the coloring and distortion of those sup-
plied. And, fourth, because of the partisan introduction of expert
testimony and the resulting conflict and confusion, the lay jury fail to
receive needful assistance in dealing with specialized matters.
There follows a consideration of recent developments in the law
of evidence in so far as they tend toward partial amelioration of the
situation outlined.
A Trend and a Manifestation.
Perhaps the most commendable feature of modem trial procedure
is the shift in emphasis from the artificial rules of admissibility to con-
siderations of relevancy. Learned commentators make uniform re-
port of a general relaxation in the rigor with which the exclusionary
rules are being applied.4 A greater faith in the intelligence of the
jury and a growing realization that "for one case gained by improper
proof, ninety-nine have been lost or improperly found on account of
the parties being precluded by artificial rules from submitting all the
facts" 5 explain the why of this change.
One facet of this changed attitude is reflected in the employment
of various devices which help to improve oral testimony. Thus,
photographs are held admissible as pictured expressions of facts ob-
served by qualified witnesses. 6  On the same principle, motion pic-
tures are received in evidence as reproductions of events that have
taken place. 7 Judicial approval has also been extended to the court-
'WIGmORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF (3d ed. 1937) § 215; Radin,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 4; cf. People v. Gonzalez, 35 N. Y. 62 (1866).
' "There is even a growing reluctance to invoke in court the rules of exclu-
sion, except where the testimony would be crucial * * *." McCormick, Tomor-
row's Law of Evidence (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 507, 581; cf. 1 WIGMORE, EvI-
DENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 662; Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects of
the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication (1939) 24 IowA L. Rlv. 191, 267
(wider admissibility); Morgan and Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward
at Evidence (1937) 50 HARv. L. REv. 909.
"* * * the judicial rules of Admissibility are destined to lessen in relative
importance during the next period of development." WiGmom, loc. cit. mupra
note 3.1 Lumpkin, J., in Johnson v. State, 14 Ga. 61 (1853). Wigmore refers to
this "* * * as a sturdy utterance of one of the champions of rationalism in a
past generation of judges * * *." 1 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 9.
'People v. Buddensieck, 103 N. Y. 487, 9 N. E. 44 (1886) (premises);
Alberti v. Ry., 118 N. Y. 77, 23 N. E. 35 (1889) (injured limbs); People
v. Smith, 121 N. Y. 581, 24 N. E. 852 (1890) (personal features) ; People v.
Cross & Brown Co., 232 App. Div. 587, 251 N. Y. Supp. 138 (1st Dept. 1931);
Ryer v. Sheroak Realty Co. Inc., 253 App. Div. 924 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 348
(2d Dept. 1938) (place of accident).
'Boyarsky v. Zimmerman Corp., 240 App. Div. 361, 270 N. Y. Supp. 134
(1st Dept. 1934), reviewed in (1934) 19 MINN. L. Rv. 124. Contra: Gibson
v. Gunn, 106 App. Div. 464, 202 N. Y. Supp. 19 (2d Dept. 1923), aff'd, 208
1939 ]
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room -use of photographs 8 and dictographs.9 And twice, recently,
talking pictures of confessions were presented before juries.'0 Of
significance is the fact that these devices serve a dual purpose: they
improve narration; they help to lessen the common defects of faulty
memory and observation.
Meeting the Evils of Bias and the Motive to Lie.
A New York court once took judicial notice of the fact that
photographs exaggerate-that photographs can lie." It has never
been necessary for any court to take formal cognizance that witnesses
can and do lie. A trial judge, however, has charged a jury that the
nervous wiping and rubbing of hands by a witness "is almost always
App. Div. 709, 202 N. Y. Supp. 927 (2d Dept. 1923) (would make trial a
"farce"), criticized in WIGMoRE, 1923-33 SUPPLEMENT § 798 as a "superficial
opinion"; cf. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.'of Calif. v. Marks, 230 Ala. 417, 161
So. 543 (1935) (improper foundation) ; State v. United Railways, 162 Md. 404,
159 Atl. 916 (1932) (dissimilarity of conditions only ground for exclusion);
Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Worth, 9 S. W. (2d) 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928)
(proper exclusion of motion pictures on the ground of immateriality).
In Feeney v. Young, 191 App. Div. 501, 181 N. Y. Supp. 481 (1st Dept.
1920), where the moving picture itself was the subject of the controversy, it
was held that the best evidence rule did-not apply, and it was therefore error
to reject the testimony of eyewitnesses to its presentation.
For a list of unreported New York cases in which motion pictures were
displayed see Kennedy, Motion Pictures in Evidence (1932) 27 IL. L. REv. 424.
8 Boyne City, G. & A. R. R. v. Anderson, 146 Mich. 328, 109 N. W. 429
(1906), wherein a phonograph was permitted to be operated in the jury's pres-
ence to reproduce sounds claimed to have been made by the operation of defen-
dant's train, the court said: "The ground for receiving the testimony of the
phonograph would seem to be stronger [than for receiving testimony for tele-
phone conversationj, since in its case there is not only proof by human witnesses
of the making of the sounds * * * but a reproduction of the sounds themselves."
See 1 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 669.
'People v. Eng Hing, 212 N. Y. 373, 106 N. E. 96 (1914) (dictograph);
Kidd v. People, 97 Colo. 480, 51 P. (2d) 1070 (1935) (dictograph) ; Andrews
v. State, 15 Ohio C. C. (N. s.) 241, 57 W. L. Bull. 505 (1912) (dictograph) ;
Commonwealth v. Clark, 123 Pa. Super. Ct. 277, 187 Atl. 237 (1936) ("speak-
6-phone"); cf. Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 123 Conn. 218, 193 Atl. 765 (1937)
(dictaphone), reviewed in (1937) 26 GEo. L. J. 162.
" People v. Hayes, 71 P. (2d) 321 (Cal. App. 1937), reviewed in (1937)
17 ORE. L. REv. 72 (stresses the necessity of a proper foundation) ; Common-
wealth v. Roller, 100 Pa. Super. Ct. 125 (1930) (treated as a combination of
the photograph and phonograph), reviewed in (1930) 78 U. oF PA. L. REv. 565,
wherein it is said: "The introduction of said pictures to facilitate trial tech-
nique again illustrates the willingness of courts to supplement, clarify, and
authenticate verbal testimony by tested scientific processes."
For the procedure to follow in the taking and presenting of such sound
pictures, see Scott, Photography in Criminal Investigations (1938) 29 J. CRam.
L. 383; so also, Kennedy, loc. cit. supra note 7.
Puleo v. Stanislaw Holding Corp., 126 Misc. 372, 213 N. Y. Supp. 601
(1926).
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an indication of lying."1 2 Although rather unsientific, this state-
ment does indicate some appreciation of the fundamental truism upon
which all methods of detecting deception are constructed, i. e., con-
scious deception is accompanied by emotional disturbances. It is re-
ported that the Chinese of ancient times based their "rice-test" 13 on
this very principle. And to this day in India it is a prevalent belief
that the movement of the big toe of the witness is a sure indication of
deception.14
During the past thirty years, deception tests of a more scientific
nature have been conceived. The psychologists and physiologists
have made offer of such tests as the Jung association word-reaction
time test,15 the Benussi respiratory, or inspiration-expiration, ratio
test,"6 the Marston systolic blood pressure test,11 and the Keeler poly-
graph.1 8  These tests are all predicated on the recording of various
indicia of emotion and interpretations of the records thus obtained.
Interpretation is based, in part, upon a comparison of the tested per-
son's "normal" response record, as obtained during a preliminary ex-
amination (consisting of immaterial and "background" questions),
with the record obtained during a subsequent examination (consisting
of material and immaterial questions). 19
Although these deception tests "seem to be accepted by psycholo-
Quercia v. United States, 289 U. S. 466, 53 Sup. Ct. 698 (1933).
"* * * the Chinese used an ancient method by which the suspect was
made to chew rice and then spit it out for examination. If the rice appeared
dry, the suspect was considered guilty, the basis of the conclusion being that his
fear of detection was supposed to inhibit the secretion of saliva." Venters,
Use of Lie Detectors (1935) 39 LAW NOTES 23.
Larson, The Berkeley Lie Detector and Other Deception Tests (1922)
47 A. B. A. REP. 619.
'MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND (1909) 73. The impracticality
of this test for court-room use was illustrated in Wigmore, Professor Munster-
berg and the Psychology of Testimony (1909) 3 Iii. L. Rv. 399.
'This test depends upon the correlation between respiratory changes and
conscious deception. See 4 J. OF EXPERImENTAL PSYCH. 1, for an extended
discussion of this test. At present, this test is not used independently but is
used in conjunction with the blood pressure test.
"' Records of changes in the systolic blood pressure are used in an attempt
to diagnose deception. For a discussion of the underlying theory, see Note(1933).13 B. U. L. Rnv. 321, 322.
Professor Wigmore has indicated that this is the sole test which has demon-
strated any utility. (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 903. It is reported in Esquire,
April, 1935, that he has "suggested that an enlarged blood-pressure indicator
like a thermometer might be devised and set up in the court room, thus enabling
the jury to observe directly the fluctuations of a witness' blood pressure while
he tells his story on the stand."; cf. Forkosh, The Lie Detector and the Courts
(1939) 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. 202, 215, where it is said: "The fact that * * * an
occasional innocent person showed even moderate symptoms of guilt indicates
the hazard of trusting too implicitly in the results of these tests."
" This apparatus records the changes in the respiration, pulse pressure and
pulse rate. See Hoover, Scientific Methods Qf Crime Detection in the Judicial
Process (1935) 4 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1, 24.
"For a detailed description of the usual procedure followed, see Forkosh,
op. cit. supra note 17, at 213 et seq.
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gists generally as being based upon a sound underlying theory",2 °
not one of these has been received with anything resembling unanim-
ity, and this, even "in the house of their friends", the psychologists
and the physiologists.
21
In 1923, a trial court's refusal of the first offer of expert testi-
mony based on a systolic blood pressure test was upheld in a federal
court.22  In 1929, an attempt to use this test on a recalcitrant defen-
dant resulted only in his smashing of the apparatus.23 Four years
later, the polygraph, an alleged (by its proponents) improvement on
the systolic blood pressure test, was denied legal recognition as a
proper basis for expert testimony by the highest court of Wisconsin.2 4
The "perfection" of the pathometer, the latest deception test, and
the conflict it has produced in our lower courts, has placed New York
in the center of the deception-detection stage. This new device is
unique in that it records the electrical phenomena developed on the
body surface during emotional changes. 25 Expert interpretation of a
pathometrical examination was admitted in People v. Kenny.2 6 Hard
on the heels of this decision came the refusal of a motion for a similar
examination in the Forte case. 27  This determination necessitated an
appellate review which resulted in a holding by the Court of Appeals
that no error was committed in refusing to allow the defendant to ex-
periment with the pathometer. 2' The reason assigned for this was
' See McCormick, Deception Tests and the Law of Evidence (1927) 15
CALIF. L. REV. 484, 485.
"See the answers to a questionnaire sent to eighty-eight members of the
American Psychological Association in McCormick, op. cit. supra note 20, at
495 et seq.
'Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (App. D. C. 1923), noted in Com-
ment (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 771; reviewed in (1924) 24 COL. L. REV. 429 with
approval; (1924) 37 HARV. L. REV. 1138 (value of any psychological test seems
questionable unless the average juror becomes extremely discriminating).
"See record in State v. Mayer, Superior Court of Kings County, Wash.,
Nov. 23, 1929 (unreported), mentioned in Note (1931) 44 HARv. L. Rav. 842.
2 State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 65, 246 N. W. 314 (1933), discussed in Inbau,
Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases (1935) 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 495,
502; discussed in Note (1933) 13 B. U. L. REV. 321.
'The underlying principles are ably discussed in Forkosh, op. cit. supra
note 17, at 205 et seq.; cf. (1939) 8 FORDHAm L. REv. 120, 121; (1938) 86 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 903.
For a description of the pathometer and the circuit see Forkosh, id. at 212
et seq.
167 Misc. 51, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 348 (Queens County Ct. 1938). This
decision received implied approval in Note (1938) 16 Cm-KENT REV. 269 and
in (1939) 8 FORDHAm L. REV. 120.
However, the more complete and better considered analyses reach an
opposite conclusion. Forkosh, op. cit. supra note 17; (1938) 29 J. CInm. L.
287.
"People v. Forte, 167 Misc. 868, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 913 (Kings County Ct.
1938).
The Forkosh article (see supra note 17) was incorporated in the minutes
of this case, so as to form part of the record on appeal.
'People v. Forte, 279 N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. (2d) 31 (1938), reviewed in
(1939) 8 FORDHAm L. REv. 120.
[ VOL. 13
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that the record was devoid of evidence that the pathometer is gen-
erally recognized by scientists "as possessing such value that reason-
able certainty can follow from tests [made with it]." 29
But a few sentences are necessary to bring home the soundness
of this opinion. The inherent weakness in every test for deception-
in the ancient Chinese "rice-test", in the systolic blood pressure test,
in the test dependent on the pathometer-is that a human being3 0
must evaluate data revealed by some technique which itself is used
only "to diagnose hypothetical subjective occurrences." 31 Inasmuch
as the tests depend largely on double diagnosis, varying inferences
may be drawn.3 2 And the extravagant claims of "infallibility", usu-
ally varying from 94% to 98%,33 must be recognized as either
proponent-puffing or the results of wishful experimentation. The
pathometer, in addition, has attracted much particular criticism. So:
1. Although the instrument works upon the electrical changes devel-
oped on the surface of the skin during emotional reactions, "there is
neither unanimity nor even approximate agreement upon the general
principles embraced within the field of bodily surface electrical phe-
nomena." 34 2. The reliability of the pathometer is to be questioned
"inasmuch as it records emotional reactions other than those produced
by lying, such as fear and excitement." 35 3. A sufficient number of
experiments under actual conditions have not been 'conducted.3 6
4. The results obtained in the forty-nine actual cases in which it has
been used have not been scientifically checked.3 7 5. The Staff of the
Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory of Northwestern University,
using a substantially similar instrument in connection with two other
recognized tests, has made no claims of infallibility.38 6. There is no
general scientific recognition of the reliability of the pathometrical
tests, "especially since they are not known to any but a few ** *." 39
It is to be noted that the court, in refusing to notice judicially that
reasonable certainty follows from these tests, relied only upon this
last objection.
Mingled feelings of admiration and confusion are experienced by
People v. Foote, 279 N. Y. 204, 205, 18 N. E. (2d) 31 (1938).
"The importance of the individual skill in cross-examination of the person
giving the test was apparent * * *'." McCormick, op. cit. supra note 20, at
489; Cf. 1 WIGMORE, Op. cit. supra note 3, § 156 (the Bertillon anthropometric
system of personal identification was greatly weakened and has been practically
discarded because of this same element of uncertainty).
'See P'orkosh, op. cit. .tpra note 17, at 225.
' Cf. People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 54, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 348, 351 (1938),
where it was said: "In this case we are dealing with a science from which
varying inferences may not be drawn."
See McCormick, loc. cit. .rpra note 20; (1938) 29 J. CRIm. L. 287, 289.
Forkosh, op. cit. supra note 17, at 231.
(1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. Rtv. 903, 904; so also, MARSTON, THE LiE
DETECTOR TEST (1938) 39 et seq.
1 (1938) J. CRIm. L. 287, 290.
= Id. at 289.
mId. at 290.
Forkosh, loc. cit. supra note 34.
1939 ]
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the layman when he learns that there are suggested and available still
other tests for deception. For example, there is the bulb-apparatus
test for muscular reflexes.40 And "some physiologists assert that bio-
chemical analysis of the blood for the presence of potassium, calcium,
and adrenal and other endocrine gland excretions, may hold the secret
to the answer sought." 41
It is interesting to speculate re: the implications that would follow
from the perfection of a nearly infallible lie detector. Sound comment
has it that the privilege against self-incrimination would not constitute
a bar to the general use of such device.42 However, since the present
jury system would be rendered obsolete,43 .general acceptance would
have to be delayed until an entirely new system of procedure could be
formulated.
Two questions of more acute interest suggest themselves. First:
Have the present types of deception tests any forensic utility? Of in-
direct utility is the use of such tests by police departments and prosecu-
tors in the preliminary investigation and examination of suspects.44 In
Wisconsin, expert testimony and the records of lie detector examina-
tions have been received in evidence where the opposing counsel stip-
ulated in advance to accept the results of such tests.45 The second
question is: assuming that, as a result of many thousands of experi-
ments with all types of temperaments under varying conditions, sci-
ence does recognize a lie detector as reasonably reliable, for what
purpose will it be used forensically? It would probably be used to im-
peach and to rehabilitate witnesses. 46  Expert testimony regarding
scientific examinations for deception will aid the jury in determining
whether or not a principal witness is worthy of belief.47 Parties to
' See Hoover, loc. cit. supra note 18.
" Hoover, op. cit. supra note 18, at 25.
"Inbau, Self-Incrimin.ation-What Can an Accused Person Be Compelled
to Dof (1937) 28 J. CRIM. L. 261, 287; McCormick, op. cit. supra note 20, at
502; N. Y. L. J., Oct. 5, 1935, p. 1134; Note (1938) 13 NOTRE DAME LAWY.
212, 214; (1924) 37 HARV. L. REv. 1138; cf. Note (1938) 16 CHI-KNT REV.
269, 271.
""If such tests ever are adopted, it is probable that the jury system will
have to be abandoned * * *." Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1921
(1922) 35 HARV. L. REv. 302, 309; cf. Forkosh, op. cit. supra note 17, at 202.
" McCormick, op. cit. supra note 20, at 501; (1939) 8 FORDHAm L. REv. 120,
121; cf. WIGMOR, op. cit. supra note 3, § 314.
" For a discussion of these cases see Inbau, Detection of Deceptiont Tech-
nique Admitted in Evidence (1935) 26 J. CRIM. L. 262; (1936) 26 id. 758;
Cf. MARSTON, op. cit. supra note 35, at 69 (mention of unreported cases in
Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio admitting testimony re: blood pressure tests).
"See Strahorn, Extra-Legal Materials and the Law of Evidence (1934)
29 ILL. L. REv. 300, 323; McCormick, op. cit. supra note 20, at 502 (corrobora-
tion and impeachment).
I "It must be borne in mind that the use of 'lie detectors' is not to establish
any independent fact in issue; its primary, indeed its sole purpose, is to demon-
strate that the defendant is worthy of belief. It is a device which tends to
sustain or discredit the defendant's credibility." People v. Forte, 167 Misc. 868,
869, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 913, 914 (1938).
[ VOL. 13
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civil and criminal actions will submit to the tests rather than have
the jury's attention directed to a refusal.48 Many difficulties wil arise
concerning the questions to be used in the tests. 49  In light of a poll
of the jury in the Kenny case 50 which revealed that five jurors ac-
cepted such expert testimony without hesitation, 51 it would be well
to remember that both the burden of coming forward with experi-
mental data and the burden of proving the reliability and the general
scientific recognition of deception tests lies with the psychologists and
the physiologists and not with the judiciary.5 2
In discussing that permanent problem of the law, the faithful
reconstruction of past events, Radin has remarked: "* * * even if
they [the lie detectors] were all completely trustworthy, they would
provide only half a solution, or somewhat less than half. It is not
enough to know whether a man is lying, but it is necessary to compel
him to tell the truth." 53 Compelling a man "to tell the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth" necessarily involves a tempo-
rary inhibition of the reasoning processes. To accomplish this the
physiologist uses a so-called truth-serum, a harmless anaesthetic which
induces a "twilight-sleep", which is the popular description of "a
mental state where consciousness is affected to the extent * * *"
that the subject makes automatic and unreasoned responses to ques-
tions.54  A comparatively small amount of experimentation in this
field has produced fairly successful results. 55 However, when the
results of one such experiment were offered in evidence to exonerate
a defendant, they were held inadmissible as self-serving statements
and truth-serum was dismissed as "clap-trap". 5 6
'Cf. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 684, effective April 2, 1938. Serologic
Blood Tests. "* * * Whenever the court orders such serologic blood tests to
be made and one of the parties shall refuse to submit to such test, such fact
shall be disclosed upon the trial unless good cause is shown to the contrary."
" Cf. People v. Forte, 167 Misc. 868, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 913 (1938).
' People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 348 (1938).
' Forkosh, op. cit. supra note 17, at 228 et seq. (poll of members of Kenny
jury by author revealed that five members of that jury accepted testimony based
on a pathometer test for deception "without hesitation" and did not "evaluate it
in the light of the entire testimony.").
'Professor Chafee's statement made in 1922 is well worth repeating today,
"Lawyers will await the results of such investigations with open minds **
Chafee, loc. cit. supra note 43.
' Radin, op. cit. supra note 1, at 4, 5.
See Inbau, Methods of Detecting Deception (1934) 24 J. CRIm. L. 1140,
1153.
'House, Why Truth Serum Should Be Made Legal (1925) 42 MED. LEG.
1. 138 (50% accuracy) ; Inbau, op. cit. supra note 42, at 288 ("Although some
fairly encouraging results have been obtained * * * experimentally and even in
actual criminal investigations the percentage of accuracy at the present time is
not very high.") ; McCormick, op. cit. supra note 20, at 493, where the author
observes: "The great superiority of this method if valid, is that * * * its results
are not dependent upon any question of interpretation * * * [but] * * * it has
never received tests adequate to enable judgment to be passed upon it."
ca State v. Hudson, 289 S. W. 920 (Mo. 1926). That part of the opinion
dealing with truth-serum is strictly a literary attempt; no attempt is made to
335"'193 9]
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The psychologist in his attempt to elicit truth relies on hypno-
tism. Evidence thus obtained has been held inadmissible in Eng-
land.57 The theory is that such evidence is both involuntary and
unreliable.
58
So it is that we realize that science has offered little aid in
either the uncovering or uprooting of bias and the motive to lie. The
only tools available for this task are the common law tests of credi-
bility '9 and "that great legal machine", cross-examination.
Experts and the Scientific Expert.
In reconstructing past events the jury often require special assis-
tance. Lay possessions prove insufficient to cope with highly spe-
cialized matters. Special experience must be and is drafted to aid the
jury in drawing intelligent inferences. Such assistance would seem
to be as invaluable as it is indispensable. Yet we read that expert
testimony is to be given "hardly any weight", 60 "is disparaged", 6' and
"is regarded * * * as the weakest character of testimony"; 02 that ex-
pert testimony "should be received with 'caution' ,,,63 and with "nar-
row scrutiny"; 04 that expert testimony "is subject to judicial suspi-
cion" 65 and is the "object of proposed reform"; 66 that "the tendencies
of the courts are constantly inclining in the direction of narrowing
the rule of its introduction"; 07 and that "it is generally safer to take
the judgment of unskilled jurors".68 This fall into disrepute is usu-
ally attributed to our party system of experts, 69 a natural by-product
of our adversary system of litigation. The vicious cycle of expert
understand the effect scopolamine has on the mind. Cf. Note (1931) 44 HARV.
L. REv. 842, 845.
'Rex v. Booker (1928) 4 D. L. R. 795 (confession probably induced by
hypnotism held inadmissible).
(1929) 42 HARV. L. REV. 704 (analogy is made to confessions obtained
during sleep).
" Howard v. Louisville Ry., 32 Ky. 309, 105 S. W. 932 (1907) (physical
appearance, mannerisms, consistency of statements); cf. Boynkin v. People,
22 Colo. 496, 45 Pac. 419 (1896) (blushing, squinting of the eyes, twitching,
squirming, throat pulsations, verbosity, avoiding eyes of examiner).
'Tracy Peerage Case (1843) 10 Cl. & F. 154.
'Note (1923) 36 HARV. L. REV. 333, 334.




O'ToLE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1937) 974.
Yerion, Expert Medical Testimony in Compensation Proceedings (1935)
2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 476.
"See note 62, supra.
'Ferguson v. Hubbell, 97 N. Y. 507, 514 (1884).
"Overholser, The Place of Psychiatry in the Criminal Law (1936) 16 B.
U. L. REV. 322; Terman, Psychology and the Law (1935) 40 COMMERCIAL L.
J. 639; Yerion, ot. cit. supra note 66, at 478; Note (1923) 36 HARV. L. REV.
333.
NOTES AND COMMENT
testimony starts with the employment and payment of different ex-
perts by the parties, 70 develops with resultant partisanship and venal-
ity,71 and closes with highly conflicting and confusing technical ver-
biage. 72  One may well query: "Who shall decide when doctors
disagree?" 73
The "do-next-to-nothing" approach to this problem relies on the
disparagement and restriction of expert testimony.74 The drafting
of the Uniform Expert Testimony Act 75 and the enactment of re-
medial legislation in a number of states 76 represent the more positive
approach. This approach attacks the evils of partisanship by provid-
ing for the court appointment of neutral and disinterested experts in
addition to the party experts. 7 7 Setting to one side available criti-
' O'TooLE, loc. cit. st pra note 65; Terman,' oc. cit. supra note 69; Note
(1923) 36 HARV. L. REv. 333 (payment of contingent fees).
U In Kentucky Traction Co. v. Humphrey, 168 Ky. 611, 182 S. W. 854, 856
(1916), the court said: "* * * there exists experts following the business of
bartering their expert or scientific knowledge to the litigant who can pay the
highest price." So also, Overholser, loc. cit. supra note 69; Overholzer, The
History and Operation of the Briggs Law of Massachusetts (1935) 2 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRoB. 436; cf. Hulbert, Psychiatric Testimony in Probate Proceed-
ings (1935) 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 448.
, See Shientag, A Ministry of Justice in Action--The Work of the New
York State Law Revision Committee (1937) 22 CORN. L. Q. 183, 192; Britt,
Blood-Grouping Test and the, Law, "The Problem of 'Cultural Lag"' (1937) 21
MINN. L. REv. 671, 698; Osborn, Book Review (1924) 37 HARV. L. REV. 787;
Note (1923) 36 HARV. L. REV. 333, 334.
'It is said that Alexander Pope -was the first to pose this question. Cf.
Hand, Historical and Practical Consideration Regarding Expert Testimony
(1901) 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54.
"' Brehm v. The Great Western R R., 34 Barb. 256 (N. Y. 1861) ; People
v. Barberi, 12 N. Y. Cr. R. 89, 47 N. Y. Supp. 168 (1896).
'THE UNIFORM EXPERT TESTIMONT Acr, approved by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (47th Annual Conference,
1937); Legis. (1938) 38 CoL. L. REv. 369.
" See Legis. (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 369, n.8 at 370 for a list of eight
statutes. See also R I. GEN. LAWS (1923) §§ 5002-5005; CAL. CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE (Deering, 1931) § 1871 (court appointment of neutral experts in
both civil and criminal cases); cf. N. Y. CODE CRUM. PROC. §§ 658, 659 (on plea
of not guilty by reason of insanity, court may appoint a commission of three
"disinterested persons" to examine defendant and report to the court); Note
(1929) 38 YALE L. J. 368; N. Y. CODE CRIM. PRoC. § 836, as am'd. Laws of
1933, c. 564.
Probably the most advanced and best conceived system of selecting mental
experts is found in the so-called Briggs Law, MAss. ANN. LAWS (Michie,
1933) c. 123, § 100-A.
Also see N. Y. LEGis. Doc. N6. 65 (1936) 801 (proposal for reform of
expert testimony in personal injury actions). Proposal failed of passage, see
id. at 1028.
Cf. Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter(1921-22) (N. Y. City Bar Ass'n Lectures on Legal Topics, pub. 1926, vol.
III) at 103: "My thesis is that * * * help should come *** from an assistant
who can inform them and not from one who inevitably *** must take on the
attitude of a partisan."
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cism 78 and questions of constitutionality,7 9 and assuming that the re-
sult of this reform will be the complete elimination of biased expert
testimony, the question still remains as to whether such testimony will
always be unconflicting. Will the absence of partisanship make for
substantial agreement in the testimony of doctors and psychiatrists?
The second question answers the first. Medical science is not
exact; 80 psychiatry is more of an art than a science.8 1 In these
fields, general principles cannot often be applied with mathematical
certainty.82 Opinions offere'd are generally based on hypothesis or
symptoms of fact rather than on actual facts. Because there is much
room for honest differences of opinion in medicine and psychiatry,
8 3
conflicting expert testimony will persist. Furthermore, since these
classes of expert testimony are not frequently "susceptible of illustra-
tion and explanation so qs to be weighed by the ordinary hearer",
84
the jury will in many instances be precluded from making an intelli-
gent choice.
However, there is available a class of expert helpers which is
characterized by an almost complete lack of conflict, and this, because
of its exactitude."s The possibility of assistance of this nature was
recognized as long ago as 1795 by a text writer who in his treatment
of "Proof by Experts" observed: "In proportion as Experience and
Science advances, the uncertainty and danger frdm this kind of proof
" See Legis. (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 369 (only minimizes the evils of par-
tisanship; appointment only in discretion of trial judge; no prescribing of
qualifications; no elimination of "hypothetical question").
" People v. Dickerson, 164 Mich. 148, 129 N. W. 199 (1910) (holding
Mich. Statute unconstitutional), criticized in 5 WIGmORE, op. cit. sapra note 4,
§ 2484; cf. People v. Strong, 114 Cal. App. 522, 300 Pac. 84 (1931); Jessner
v. State, 202 Wis. 184, 231 N. W. 634 (1930).
' Robertson, Medico-Legal Evidence (1938) 16 CAN. B. REv. 185; Taft,
Opinion Evidence of Medical Witnesses (1927) 14 VA. L. REv. 81; cf. Clark
v. Baird, 9 N. Y. 183, 194 (1853).
For one case where medical testimony was exact see Mitchell v. Buffalo
Cold Storage Co., 252 App. Div. "715, 298 N. Y. Supp. 800 (3d Dept. 1937).
' See 19 ENcYc. oF Soc. ScI. 58.
'See People v. Barberi, 12 N. Y .Cr. R. 89, 47 N. Y. Supp. 168, 173
(1896).
Taft, op. cit. supra note 80, at 87; Yerion, op. cit. supra note 66, at 477;
cf. McDonough v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 228 Mass. 450, 117 N. E. 836, 838
(1917), wherein the court, referring to medical expert testimony, said: "The
single circumstance that it was uncontradicted is not enough to compel belief
in its accuracy."
"Osborn, Reasons and Reasoning in Expert Testinuoy (1935) 2 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 488, 489; cf. People v. Youngs, 151 N. Y. 210, 45 N. E. 460
(1896).
6 "Many lawyers argue glibly that expert testimony is 'always in conflict'.
This is not true of much technical expert testimony." OsBORN, op. cit. mtpra
note 84, at 492.
For a comparison of degrees of definiteness found in expert testimony
based on chemistry, physics, and medicine see WIGMOx, op. cit. supra note 3,
§231; cf. id. §294.
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diminishes * * *." 86 One hundred and forty years later, the words,
"The guilt of the defendant is as conclusively established as it is pos-
sible for it to be", were uttered by a court in a criminal case wherein
the only evidence offered against the defendant was supplied by ex-
perts.8 7 In this wise it becomes apparent that the most helpful con-
tribution of science to the solution of the problem of reconstructing
past events has been the truly scientific expert.
The scientific expert brings to the attention of the tribunal facts
which can be perceived only by either the use of instruments which
offer mechanical aid to the senses or by investigations based on the
invariable laws of chemistry.88 By applying understandable princi-
ples of varying universality the scientific expert makes more usable
the facts thus perceived. On this base of scientifically perceived facts
and by the application of these principles are the conclusions of the
truly scientific expert fashioned. Thus it is that it can be said
"* * * fingerprint identification is an exact science, and that there-
fore there can be no honest differences of opinion on the part of com-
petent experts." 89
Trial court procedure has been adjusted so as to permit a
more effectual presentation of this "evidence of the highest rank". 90
A scientific expert is now required to describe and detail the
factual base of his conclusion. 91 He may outline step by step
the reasoning which leads to his conclusion.9 2  Since his testimony
is susceptible of demonstration he may explain, illustrate and com-
pare.13  Use may be made of crayon and pencil or of a blackboard.
94
Found in GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENcE (edition of Capel Lofft, Dub-
lin, 1795) ; Hand, op. cit. supra note 73, at 47.
'Magnuson v. State, 187 Wis. 122, 203 N. W. 749 (1925).
"'Perception by scientific processes' means that by aid of such processes
we can add to our knowledge other data not discernible by the unaided senses,
or can make more accurate and more usable the data already discernible."
WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 220.Shaw, Fingerprints for the Lawyer (1930) 4 TEmP. L. Q. 227, 237.
' Boyd v. Gosser, 78 Fla. 70, 82 So. 758 (1919).
"The amount of importance to be attached to what the experts say
depends entirely upon the factual basis for their conclusion." Hahn v. Duveen,
133 Misc. 871, 234 N. Y. Supp. 185 (1929).
People v. Roach, 215 N. Y. 592, 604, 109 N. E. 618, 623 (1915) ("the wit-
ness * * * specified the circumstances upon which he predicated his opinion") ;
Fekete v. Fekete, 323 Ill. 468, 154 N. E. 215 (1926) ; cf. Note C1934) 9 \ST.
JOHN's L. REv. 102, 103; cf. Hoover, op. cit. supra note 18, at 4.
"It is obvious that if an expert opinion is to be properly weighted and
considered by the hearer, the reasoning process itself must be outlined * * *"
Osborn, op. ct. supra note 84, at 489- Venuto v. Luzzo, 148 App. Div. 164,
132 N. Y. Supp. 1066 (1st Dept. 1911i; In re Koch, 33 Misc. 153, 68 N. Y.
Supp. 375 (1900) ; (1927) 31 LAW NorEs 84.
' Commonwealth v. Best, 180 Mass. 492, 62 N. E. 748 (1902) (ballistics);
McGrath v. Fash, 244 Mass. 327, 139 N. E. 303 (1923) (comparison of X-ray
plates); State v. Cerciello, 86 N. J. L. 309, 90 Atl. 1112 (1914) (fingerprints) ;
see Inbau, Finger Prints and Pahn Prints (1935) 25 J. CRIm. L. 500, 507;
Goddard, Scientific Identification of Firearms and Bullets (1926) 17 J. CRIm.
L. 154, 262.
" Rogers, Progress in Proof of Handwriting (1935) 30 LAW NoTEs 47
1939]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Photographs and enlargements of photographs may be presented for
jury inspection.95 Lantern slides and the projectoscope may be em-
ployed. 96  The jury may look through a microscope.97  The scien-
tific expert may conduct experiments in the court-room.98 Thus, a
sensible procedure has evolved which assists the jury to complete
understanding on highly specialized matters. Because the jury are
enabled to follow and understand they are equipped to weigh intelli-
gently and, therefore, to make the best possible use of expert scientific
testimony. Even if conflict occasionally does arise, the jury can now
distinguish between the charlatan and the competent scientific expert.99
A reviewer has said that "Waiting for the advent of an abso-
lutely infallible lie detector is like waiting for the irrefutable proof." 100
The analogy is not particularly apt. Happily, we can discern faintly,
at least, the arrival of traces of "the irrefutable proof" in certain cases
involving scientific expert testimony concerning such matters as micro-
analysis,' 0 ' fingerprints, 10 2 palmprints, 10 3 sole prints, 10  ballistics, 10 5
(crayon and paper); McKay v. Lasher, 121 N. Y. 477, 24 N. E. 711 (1890)
(blackboard illustrations) ; cf. Walker, The Blackboard and Criminal Defenses
(1937) 43 CASE AND COMMENT 14.
'Hoffman v. Prussian Nat. Ins. Co., 181 App. Div. 412, 168 N. Y. Supp.
841 (2d Dept. 1918) (photographic enlargements of handwritings); Scott v.
Thrall, 77 Kan. 68, 95 Pac. 563 (1908) (.photographs of writings) ; Lamble v.
State, 96 N. J. L. 231, 114 AtI. 346 (1921) (photographs of fingerprints);
Adams v. Ristine, 138 Va. 273, 132 S. E. 126 (1924) (photographic enlarge-
ments of writings) ; Osborn, Progress in Proof of Handwriting and Docu-
ments (1933) 24 J. CRIM. L. 118; Inbau, Firearms Identificatiom in "Ballistics"
(1934) 24 J. CRIm. L. 825. Contra: Taylor Will Case, 10 Abb. Prac. Rep. 300
(N. Y. 1871).
In Hoag v. Wright, 174 N. Y. 36, 66 N. E. 579 (1903), the court observed:
"This method [using photographs] makes a strong appeal on lay minds."
" State v. Kuhl, 42 Nev. 185, 175 Pac. 190 (1918) (photographs of palm
prints projected on screen).
"2 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1152; cf. Frank v. Chemical Nat. Bank,
45 Super. Ct. 452 (N. Y. 1879).
'Moon v. State, 22 Ariz. 418, 198 Pac. 288 (1921) (expert demonstrated
how he obtained fingerprints from blank paper); People v. Chimovitz, 237
Mich. 247, 211 N. W. 650 (1927) (expert allowed to make prints of the jury
to illustrate fingerprint identification) ; Stacy v. State, 49 Okla. Crim. 154,
292 Pac. 885 (1930); cf. People v. Constatino, 153 N. Y. 24, 47 N. E. 37
(1897).
9 "* * * what scientific methods and apparatus has been able to do is to
reveal facts, and the facts can be made, by microscoping and photography, as
plain to the tribunal as to the expert; so that the observer may form his own
opinion adequately from these facts." Wigmore, Modern Chirographic Science
as Applied to Detect Typed Frauds (1926) 21 ILL. L. REv. 299, 301 [review of
Lyon v. Oliver, 316 Ill. 292, 148 N. E. 251 (1926)] ; cf. Magnuson v. State,
187 Wis. 122, 203 N. W. 749 (1925).
"'(1939) 8 FORDHAM L. REV. 120, 122.
"'People v. Wallage, 353 Ill. 30, 186 N. E. 540 (1933) ; Magnuson v. State,
187 Wis. 122, 203 N. W. 749 (1925).
' People v. Roach, 215 N. Y. 592, 109 N. E. 618 (1915) ; Moon v. State,
22 Ariz. 418, 198 Pac. 288 (1921) ; People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, 96 N. E.
1077 (1911); Stacy v. State, 49 Okla. Crim. 154, 292 Pac. 885 (1930); cf.
Note (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 887 (fingerprints can be forged; cautions
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questioned handwriting,0 6 questioned typewriting,10 7 document ex-
amination, 08 radiographs, 10 9 photomicrographs,"10 spectrographs,"'
chemical analysis," 2 blood grouping tests,1 3 and scientific tests for
intoxication." 4.
HARoLD PELLER.
against over-evaluation); but cf. Lee, Further Discussion of the Evidentiary
Value of Fingerprints (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 320.
For a review of leading cases and a general discussion, Inbau, Finger
Prints and Palm Prints (1935) 25 J. CRm. L. 500.
103 State v. Kuhl, 42 Nev. 185, 175 Pac. 190 (1918) ; State v. Lapan, 101
Vt. 124, 141 Atl. 686 (1928); People v. Les, 267 Mich. 648, 255 N. W. 407
(1934).
1Commonwealth v. Bartolini, 13 N. E. (2d) 382 (Mass. 1938), cert.
denied, 304 U. S. 565, 58 Sup. Ct. 950 (1938). Sole prints are not to be con-
fused with footprints, see (1938) 12 U. OF CIN. L. Rv. 611.
1 People v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 216, 172 N. E. 734 (1930); People v. Richard-
son, 251,App. Div. 916, 297 N. Y. Supp. 514 (3d Dept. 1937); see Goddard,
loc. cit. upra note 93; Inbrau, loc. cit. mupra note 95.
"'°Boyd v. Gasser, 78 Fla. 70, 82 So. 758 (1919) ; see OSBORN, QUESTIONED
DocuMEaNTs (2d ed. 1929).
1 People v. Storrs, 207 N. Y. 147, 100 N. E. 730 (1912) ; People v. Risley,
214 N. Y. 75, 108 N. E. 200 (1915); People v. Werblow, 212 App. Div. 445,
209 N. Y. Supp. 88 (1st Dept. 1925)_; see Osborn, Fraudulent Typewriting in
Legal Documents (1934) 20 A. B. A. J. 708.
'&SMatter of Hopkins, 172 N. Y. 360, 65 N. E. 173 (1902) (age of ink);
In re Oliver's Will, 126 Misc. 511, 214 N. Y. Supp. 154 (1926) (paper) ; In re
Jackson's Estate, 127 Misc. 187, 215 N. Y. Supp. 230 (1926) ; In re Wendel's
Estate, 146 Misc. 260, 262 N. Y. Supp. 41 (1933) (watermark); Lyon v. Oliver,
316 Ill. 292, 147 N. E. 251 (1925) (chemical erasure).
''State v. Matheson, 130 Iowa 44, 103 N. W. 137 (1905) (X-ray photo
introduced to illustrate presence and position of bullet); State v. Casey, 108
Ore. 386, 213 Pac. 77 (1923) (wound on arm); see also Leone v. Booth
Steamship Co., 232 N. Y. 183, 185, 133 N. E. 439 (1921) (fracture).
1 People v. McDonald, 365 Ill. 233, 6 N. E. (2d) 182 (1936); State v.
Clark, 156 Wash. 543, 287 Pac. 18 (1930) ; Magnuson v. State, 187 Wis. 122,
203 N. W. 749 (1925).
1 State v. Kennedy (N. Y. 1933) (unreported) discussed at length in
Wilson, Spectrographic Analysia as an Aid in Identification Problems (1934)
25 J. CRIm. L. 160.
7 People v. Roach, 215 N. Y. 592, 109 N. E. 618 (1915) ; State v. Johnson,
37 N. M. 280, 21 P. (2d) 813 (1933); cf. Hand v. State, 26 Ala. App. 317,
159 So. 275 (1935).
. State v. Wright, 591 Ohio App. 191, 17 N. E. (2d) 428 (1938). Contra:
Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 95 Cal. Dec. 4, 74 P. (2d) 1043 (1937), criticized in
Britt, Blood-Grouping Tests and More "Cultural Lag" (1938) 22 MINN. L.
REv. 836, 839, where it is observed: "With scientific evidence unavailable, how-
ever, the court's decision should never have rested on matters of verbal
testimony."
n'Cf. Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to
Determine Intoxication (1939) 24 IowA L. REv. 191.
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